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The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime
Submerged Traditional Doctrine
Demands upon tidal areas1 (for navigation, fishing, raw materials,
recreation, aesthetics) vary directly with increases in population, com-
merce, and navigation. As with any other inherently limited resource,
when demands increase, it becomes more important to insure both its
widest possible and most efficient utilization.'
When demand is low, as for example in a thinly populated region
with little commerce, private ownership provides an adequate method
of regulation at the lowest possible cost. On the other hand, when con-
ditions become more crowded and competitive, organization by private
property, with its right to exclusive use, is likely to conflict with the
goal of ensuring the resource's widest possible use. Moreover, to the
extent that the right to use tideland resources is allocated purely by
the "invisible hand" of the market, unfair and inefficient resource al-
location will result from insufficient consideration of externalties and
interests not measured by the market's exclusively economic criteria.0
Given the number and importance of the conflicting interests in
tidal areas, and given the imperfections of the private market and earlier
regulatory systems, it is hardly surprising that a law of the foreshore
proved necessary, or that this law is ancient and complex. The law
has had to hold the balance between the many combinations of con-
flicting interests, especially when interests that would not otherwise be
adequately recognized or protected have been involved.4
I. Although not always used with the same meaning in the case literature, the "shore"
is usually and hereinafter defined as "that ground that is between the ordinary high
water and low water mark." LoRD HALE, DE JuRa MAPlS (1786) [hereinafter cited as
HALE, DJ.M.], republished in S. MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FonsuoRE 378 (1888) [herein.
after cited as MoOR, FoREsHoRE]. The "foreshore," also used loosely, Is often treated
synonymously with "shore." E.g., Scratton v. Brown, 4 B &c C 485 (1825). The main deflnil.
tional confusion is caused by rivers and estuaries that rise and fall somewhat, but not
completely, with the tides and which are treated in legal theory in much the same way
as the ocean front shore. "The word 'foreshore,' used in the later English decisions,
appears . . . to denote the shore and bed of the sea, and of every channel, creek, bay,
estuary, and of every navigable river of the United Kingdom, as far up the same as the
tide flows ...... J. GouLa, A TREATIsE ON THE LAW OF WATERS § 27, at 61 n.1 (1900).
We will use "foreshore" in this second broader sense.
2. Maximum benefits are not obtained from a resource unless (1) conflicting claims are
given priorities that accurately reflect their relative importance and (2) provision is made
for multiple use to the extent that less pressing claims can be allowed without seriously
damaging higher priority uses.
3. If the private market system is imperfect, the earlier system of feudal tenures re.
flected even fewer interests-presumably one of the reasons for the early modern shift to
laissez-faire.
4. For example, the interest of navigators in any one portion of the foreshore Is almost
762
The Public Trust in Tidal Areas
The courts have been and are faced with what is essentially a prob-
lem in cost-benefit analysis,5 but they have felt themselves unable to
make their decisions on overtly normative and economic grounds.
Charged with the duty of resolving disputes regarding the use of tidal
areas in a "principled" manner, the courts have had to articulate rules
to balance and order the conflicting interests. This task has not been
easy since the most reasonable and beneficial ordering of interests differs
from case to case and from period to period.
Over the centuries, courts have repeatedly tried to redefine sup-
posedly "immutable" rules to fit the most common contemporary con-
ditions. As we shall see below, the law has reversed direction several
times and has eddied back and forth a great deal. Nonetheless a rela-
tively dear, because relatively constant, core of rights exists alongside
the many doctrinal confusions and inconsistencies. To understand the
inherited doctrines and to foresee the logic of their future develop-
ment, we must first try to give them their proper historical perspective.
I. Historical Survey
A. Roman Law
Roman jurisprudence, developed in a society with heavy commerce,
with important urban concentrations, and with a legal heritage from
the sea-dependent Greeks,( held that by the most basic "natural law"
the "air, running water, the sea, and consequently the seashore" were
"common to all."' 7
No one therefore is forbidden access to the seashore, provided
he abstains from injury to [improvements]. . . . [A]ll rivers and
harbours are public, so that all persons have a right to fish therein
.. everyone is entitled to bring his vessel to the bank [of a river],
always too fleeting to allow them to protect their vital interests through direct control
(e.g., ownership). Similarly, citizen interests in aesthetics or bathing, while significant in
the aggregate, are generally too indirect and atomized to be easily recognized by the
economic measures of the market.
5. Joseph Sax, in his just published article concerning judicial intervention in the
public trust area, suggests that the courts' role is to ensure full cost-benefit analysis in the
resource-use decision process. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MAic. L. REv. 471, 488, 56- (1970).
6. JUSr tAN, INsrrtrrm 1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.10 (4th ed. J.B. Moyle transl. 18S9).
7. Id., 2.1.1. Schultes expands on this point:
By the Roman law, the sovereignty of government extended over the sea, but
the occupation of it belonged to all the subjects of the empire universally, for the
unlimited exercise of fishing, navigating, and taking water, and as this privilege was
illimitable and unrestrainable, so, therefore, it was incapable of individual exclusive
appropriation ....
H. SctULTEs, AQUATIC RioTrs 2 (1839), citing Herodian Lib. 2, cap. 15.
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and fasten cables to the trees growing there and use it as a resting
place for the cargo, as freely as he may navigate the river itself.
But the ownership of the bank is in the owner of the adjoining
land, and consequently so too is the ownership of the trees which
grow upon it. Again, the public use of the seashore, as of the sea
itself, is part of the law of nations; consequently everyone is free
to build a cottage upon it for purposes of retreat, as well as to dry
his nets and haul them up from the sea. But they cannot be said to
belong to anyone as private property, but rather are subject to the
same law as the sea itself, with the soil or sand which lies beneath
it.8
This imperial law is the original foundation from which the common
law developed; 9 Bracton and Fleta copied it extensively, especially in
this area.10 It has been used in modern cases in which the court has
sought to whittle down private claims perceived to be contrary to the
public interest.1 Where subsequent law is found to differ, proponents
of the public trust can hold the original Roman law up as a useful
model of doctrinal purity to which we should return.
B. The Dark Ages
As is well known, with the decline of the Roman Empire, Europe
retrogressed in terms of commerce, navigation, and effective govern-
mental administration. Public ownership of waterways and tidal areas
frequently gave way to ownership by local powers and feudatories.
Many continental princes, for example, came to claim that the right
to fish was their personal property and required that all their fishermen
be licensed for a fee.' 2 In the British Isles, then a thinly populated
frontier, this process of decentralizing control was far advanced by the
time of the Domesday Book.13 The English King's jurisdictional and
8. JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES, 2.1.1-2.1.6. See also CELsus D. 43, 8, 3; 2 C. SHERMAN, ROMAN
LAW IN THE 'MODERN WORLD 140 et seq. (1917); N. KARADGE-IsxRow, US CIOSES PUnLiQuEs
FN DROIT ROMAIN 66 et seq., 90 et seq. (1928); W. HUNTErT, ROMAN LAW 164 el seq. (1876);
J. ORTOLAN, Tirm HISTORY OF ROMAN LAW 620 et seq. (1870 ed., I. Prichard and D.
Nasmith transl. 1871); R. 'MELVILLE, ROMAN LAw 218 et seq. (3d ed. 1921); 2 R. POUND,
READINGS IN ROSmAN LAW AND THE CIVIL LAW AND IMIODERN CODES AS DtVELOPiLENT
THEREOF 47-63 (issued privately at Harvard 1916).
9. "And even our own early law writers did not hesitate to hold nearly the same
doctrine as part of our own law." R. HALL, ESSAY ON THE RIGMTS OF THE CROWN AND TIlt
PRIVILEGES OF THE SUBJECT IN THE SEASHORE OF THE REAiMr 105 (2d ed. 1875).
10. SCHULTES, supra note 7, at 125. See also K. GuTERBOCK, BRACTON AND 1115 RELATION
TO THE RoMAN LAW passim (B. Coxe transl. 1866).
11. See, e.g., Scott v. Wilson, 3 N.H. 321, 324 (1825); Franklin, Concerning tle Influcned
of Roman Law on the Formulation of the Constitution, 38 TULANE L. REV. 621 (1964);
Stein, The Attraction of the Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary America, 52 VA. L. REv. 402
(1966).
12. ScHULTES, supra note 7, at 6 et seq. The Norman conquerors ,nay well have
brought that idea from the continent.
13. "Numerous several private, exclusive fisheries in tidal waters were in existence
before the date of Domesday, and in non-tidal waters the fisheries appear to have been
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sovereign claims to tidal areas became confused with a personal private
property claim, a confusion handily furthered to this day by successors
in interest to the King, notably the American states.' 4 The King claimed
a private interest in tidal and riverbed soil, and consequently the pri-
vate right to whatever could be found on or under the soil-be it sand,
stones, minerals, seaweed and shells (for fertilizer), or deserted wrecks
or flotsam that washed up onto the shore. He also claimed the right to
-several fishery" (an exclusive private right to fish) in these areas.
Since private ownership always entails the right to alienate, and since
the King could not easily enjoy these interests everywhere directly,
Saxon grants, confirmed and extended by the Norman kings, vested
the largest portion of the English foreshore in particular subjects.15
Several especially anomalous aspects of this royal grab for property
survived well into the modem age. In theory, the Crown had the exclu-
sive right to certain types of fish,'0 and it retained the right to take a
net down many of the kingdom's rivers several times a year through all
private fisheries.'7 Between what the King claimed for himself and what
the lords received by grant or took by prescription, the old common
omership in the public provided for in Roman law was seriously if
unevenly eroded.
C. Magna Charta
This process of proliferating private ownership and control of tidal
areas led to increasing public inconvenience. The Magna Charta, in
part a reaction to these inconveniences, can be seen as a salient point
at which the doctrinal trend began to shift back in the direction of
protecting the public's interest, especially in the areas of navigation
and fishery rights. The steps taken in this period, however, were in-
significant when compared with those which have since been attributed
all appropriated to the lords of the manors." S. Moopx & H. Moonu, TnE HisTrony AND
LAw OF FisEmRs xliii (1903). [Hereinafter cited as MooaE & MooRE, FisnEars.] "[Such
fisheries] existed in almost every piece of tidal water round the coasts which was naturally
available for the profitable exercise of an exclusive fishery." Id., xliixliii. But see the less
well documented assertions of HALL, supra note 9. at 47.
14. In the words of a California legislative committee: "[The territorial water became
embedded in history and law as a tangible asset to be enumerated in every king's list of
riches." REPORT or T E STATE INmmi CovnirrrE ON TiDELANDS, SENATE OF TRE STATE OF
CA.FoRNLA 21 (1953).
15. MooRE, FoRnsioRE 639. This conclusion is contrary to that of Hall. While recog-
nizing that it is more difficult to prove a negative, and also that Moore favors laissa.faire
private ownership while Hall is a partisan of the public trust theory, Moore's more
recent and much better documented study is more persuasive.
16. MooRE AND MOORE, FsHmmRIs 191. These royal fish were whales, sturgeon, and
porpoises.
17. Id. at 81.
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to it. Every grain of public interest protection to be found in the Magna
Charta was subsequently seized upon and developed to illogical and
unhistorical lengths by a legal system struggling to adapt the law of
the foreshore to new and more demanding economic and political
conditions. In the process of developing ("interpreting") the terms of
the contract made at Runnymede, the courts, while never abandoning
the original Roman conception of a general common ownership in all
the people, began to speak in terms of particular guaranteed rights.
The resulting doctrinal ambiguity continues to this day, although the
emphasis on particular public rights or easements has become dominant.
By considering both what the Magna Charta actually provided and what
has since been claimed for it, we can get a pretty clear idea of how far,
and in what direction, the common law has moved over the centuries.
At the time of Magna Charta, river navigation was threatened by
the large number of weirs (permanent fishing structures fixed to the
bottom) and other such devices-so much so that Chapter 3318 specif-
ically prohibits them: "All kydells [weirs] for the future shall be re-
moved altogether from Thames and Medway, and throughout all
England, except upon the seashore." [Emphasis added.]10
The common law developed this simple provision a very great dis-
tance as it sought to broaden the public's interest. Although the pro-
vision in all versions of the Charter prohibits weirs only, and then
only in inland waters, the presumed general intent to insure unob-
structed passage for navigation has been seized upon as a basis for re-
peated assertions that the super-sanction of Magna Charta prohibited
all obstructions.20
The exception made in the last four words of Chapter 33, "except
upon the seashore" (nisi per costeram maris), seems to render this part
of the Charter almost useless to those championing the public interest
in tidal areas. If anything, it is harmful in that it has been interpreted
by Lord Hale to imply that the seabed below the low water mark
(where most weirs were located) might be alienable to private property
18. Chapter 23 of the revised "Great Charter" of 1225. The last four words excepting
the seashore were added by Henry III in the revised version.
19. This provision of the Charter is still on the English statute books. J. HoLT
MAGNA CARTA 1 (1965). "It grew from the privilege the City of London had won hit Its
charters of 1196 and 1199 to destroy all such nuisances affecting access to and from Its
port." Id. at 49.
20. The constantly cited seven-line report of Rex v. Clark, 12 Mod. 615 (1701) (con-
cerning locks not weirs) is typical: "And per Holt, Chief Justice, to hinder the course of
a navigable river is against Magna Charta, c. 23 ...... See also J. ANGELL, A TitrAnst:
ON THE LAWv OF WATERCOURSES 194 (1840). [Hereinafter cited as ANGELL, WA'rTCOURS-.]
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holders.21 This chapter is the basis on which Magna Charta has been
cited, with some considerable exaggeration, as grounds for a public
easement in freely navigable waterways, but it cannot be stretched to
cover what it specifically excepts.
This chapter of Magna Charta has also been interpreted to bar
several fisheries by extrapolation from its banning one of their most
effective tools. However, the protection of navigation provides a more
convincing and complete rationale. Weirs are a much more likely
impediment to navigation in rivers than in the sea. Moreover, it seems
unlikely that the king would have allowed fishing monopolies in the
sea and not in inland waters, where a larger proportion of the potential
fishing areas were claimed by the riparian owners.--
The only other portion of Magna Charta faintly related to the
public interest in waters or tidal areas is Chapter 47: "All forests that
have been made such in our time shall forthwith be disafforested; and
a similar course shall be followed with regard to river-banks that have
been placed 'in defense' by us in our time." [Emphasis added.]3 Al-
though there, is no specific exception of tidal areas here, there is also
no mention of them.
Once again, however, the common law has expanded the Magna
Charta almost unrecognizably over the years.2 4 Moore and Moore argue
persuasively that there is no historical basis for associating Chapter 47
with fisheries-that ancient records referring to rivers "in defense"
never refer to fishery, but instead are concerned with the -epair of banks
and bridges to accommodate the royal interest in falconry. - However,
21. HALE, D.J.M., supra note 1, at 389.
22. W. MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA, 344 (2d. ed. 1914).
22. Chapter 16 of the "Great Charter" of 1225.
24. Blackstone contributed heavily to this process:
A free fishery, or exclusive right of fishing in a public river [i.e., with no grant of
the soil], is also a royal franchise [i.e., a royal prerogative (a right or interest held by
the Crown for its own benefit and not as a matter of public trust) delegated to a
subject] ... ; though the making of such grants, and by that means appropriating
what seems unnatural to restrain, the use of running uater, was prohibited for the
future by King John's great charter: and the rivers that were fenced in his time were
directed to be laid open... . This opening was extended by the second and third
charters of Henry III to those also that were fenced under Richard I: so that a
franchise of free fishery must be at least as old as the reign of Henry II.
SIR W. BLACESTONE, THE COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 3*.4 (4th ed. 1876)
[Hereinafter cited as BLACKSTONE, COMIENTAPS]. See also SCHlULTMS, "upra note 7, at 76.
25. MfooRE 8 MooRE, FsHmus 12 et seq. See also W. MCKEcVNIE, MACNA CARTA 435
et seq. (2d ed. 1914). Moore & Moore report extensively on the first known case citing
Magna Ghata in relation to this area. The Citizens of York attempted to block the Earlof Cornwall from imposing tolls and requiring fishing licenses in river waters thcy had
long used free by custom. Although they' did not mention the argument when the case
was first adjudicated (in their favor on the grounds of custom) in 1280, when the
petitioned Parliament on the same issue in 1314. they did argue that putting the.se waters
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even Moore and Moore are forced to recognize that, historical accuracy
notwithstanding, it is "now settled law that Magna Charta was the
statute that prevented the creation of several fisheries in tidal waters
.... ."20 Chief Justice Taney of the U.S. Supreme Court earlier reached
much the same conclusion in the benchmark case of Martin v. Wad-
dell.2 7 This development is especially strange because, while Magna
Charta Chapter 47 refers to rivers and not to tidal waters, the common
law of England, presumably based on this Chapter, holds that there is
no public right to fish in non-tidal waters, even though navigable, not.
withstanding such a right in tidal areas.28
D. Transition to the Modern Law
Although Magna Charta surely did not go so far as it has subsequently
been held to have gone, it was nonetheless a step in the direction of
greater regulation of waterways in the public interest. As England and
English commerce continued to grow, statutes29 and case judgments
continued to expand the public's rights in and control over the nation's
water resources. Later theorists have attempted to bring this stream
of developments together under a "public trust" theory of tidal and
navigable waters. One such synthesis (by an ardent public trust pro-
ponent) follows:
[I]t cannot be construed that the king has any other legal tenure
in the rights of fishery and navigation than belong to him in the
character of protector of public and common rights. And hence
it is that the king has no authority either to grant the exclusive
liberty of fishing in any arm of the sea, or to do anything which
will obstruct its navigation. The king, it is true, may grant the soil
of any arm of the sea,. .. but the right of the grantee so derived is
always subservient to the public rights before mentioned.80
In other words, public trust theory held that the public had certain
important rights in the foreshore, which rights superseded any con-
in defense was "contra tenorem Magnae Chartac," Records regarding the final outcome of
the case have been lost. MoonE & MooRE, FisHERIES 15-18.
26. Id. at 13. Note the emphasis on tidal waters notwithstanding Magna Charta.
27. Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842): "The question Is not
free from doubt, and the authorities referred to in the English books cannot, perhlaps,
be altogether reconciled. But... the question must be regarded as settled In England
against the right of the king since Magna Charta to make such a grant [of several fishery,
which includes the soil, in navigable waters]."
28. Johnston v. O'Neill, 1911 A.C. 552; Pearce v. Scotcher, 9 Q.B.D. 162 (1882), Reece
v. Miller, 8 Q.B.D. 626 (1881). Alone of the American states, New Jersey still follows this
rule.
29. Partially listed in HALE, D.J.M. 388-89.
30. J. ANGELL, A TREATiSE ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN TiDE WATERS AND IN Tri1 SOIL
AND SHORES THEREOF 33-34 (1st ed. 1826). [Hereinafter cited as ANGELL, TIM Wxrms.]
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fficting private rights, including those claimed by the King. The King
was trustee for these public rights, but he could not appropriate them
to his own use.
For centuries after Magna Charta there were few reported cases be-
cause tidal area resources were still generally abundant. As a result,
public trust theory developed only very gradually. With the advent of
the commercial and industrial revolutions in the early modem period,
however, the pace of doctrinal development speeded up. Public trust
proponents pushed to expand the scope of the citizens' existing ease-
ment rights and to "rediscover" new categories. For a variety of prac-
tical and historical reasons discussed below, the dominant approach
under the theory was to reserve a series of particular rights to the public,
and thus to limit the prerogatives of private ownership.
This "easement" approach is theoretically inconsistent with the tra-
ditional Roman concept of common ownership by all the citizenry. It
presumes private ownership, which the Roman model denies. This
theoretical difference, however, has prevented neither coexistence nor
confusion of identity. The Courts have never forsaken the theory of
ancestral Roman law, and the Roman approach recently has been
gaining ground in practice. In case by case adjudication of contro-
versies between putative owners and other citizens, the broader prin-
ciples of the Roman model can only lend support to a claimed easement
under the public trust theory.
The theoretical frictions which had previously existed between the
Roman and public trust models were aggravated by pressures brought
to bear by laissez-faire liberals and their commercial allies. Whereas
both Roman and public trust models called for the state to act as
trustee for the public interest, laissez-faire theorists wished to do away
with feudal encumbrances and to rely instead upon private ownership
and the market's invisible hand.3 There was a greater perceived need
for doing away with irrational feudal regulation and for widening
assured access to tidal resources than for regulating the proposed mul-
tiple use. This historical movement, coming as it did at a period of
especially rapid growth in the public trust theory, strongly reinforced
the theory's existing tendency to develop in the framework of a series
of public easements imposed on a largely private fee ownership system
31. This is the position reflected, for example, in MooRin & MooRn, F snrms and
fooRE, FORESHO, . The argument was given great impetus by the 1849 speech of Mr.
Sergeant Mferewether representing the City of London against the Crown, reproduced in
HAL.L, supra note 9, Appendix. See also Blundell v. Caterall, 5 B. & Aid. 263 (1821); Ball
v. Herbert, 3 T.R. 253 (1789).
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rather than that of public ownership through the state (a model sub.
sequently followed in many socialist societies).82 Although, given the
subsequent advent of democratic government, this early Liberal bias
is no longer a necessary block to government trustee ownership, social
policy against overcentralization continues to argue for a similar result.
The minimum necessary easement approach to protecting the public
trust became the chosen way for other reasons as well. Because large
portions of the tidal areas and navigable rivers had already become
private property in Britain, it would have been difficult or impossible
for the courts to expropriate them. To reclaim these lands for the
public would have been unfair to the current owners (especially to
b.f.p.'s), many of whom had invested in improvements. Moreover, even
disregarding the predictable reaction of the King, one of the realm's
largest property owners, such court intervention would have encoun-
tered insurmountable political opposition. On the other hand, custom
sanctioned at least some of the desirable public easements, definitely
including navigation, long the most important of the rights from a
social point of view. To sanctify, refurbish, and defend against encroach-
ment what was in any case customary was much more feasible. Ease-
ments also proved a much more flexible tool than fee interests because
they are defined in terms of activities, not land. An acre is an acre,
but "navigation" or "commerce" can be defined in various ways. Such
flexibility, even if purchased at the cost of some uncertainty, better
enables judges to match law and justice, case by case. The easement
model is also sufficiently loose-jointed to appear to encompass the com-
plex and often inconsistent set of customary relations and rights that
had come into existence well before a theory was needed to explain
them.3
Furthermore, by allowing continued private ownership, the state
avoided great unnecessary expense, both in terms of maintenance and
regulation. Much of any country's tidal areas are still not in need of
detailed regulation to assure effective and fair resource allocation and
maintenance; 34 statutorily regulated private ownership will do the job,
32. The Liberal easement approach sought to define specific areas of the public Interest
that were to take priority over the King's interests, definitely including the jus publicurn
of navigation and, with declining certainty, those of free fishing, sand, seaweed, bathing,
etc. The old Roman model, still with followers, by contrast suggested that the tidal areas
were not the Crown's to alienate. State ownership is close to the Roman position except
that it makes regulation easier.
33. The concept of a "public," for example, would have been virtually unintelligible
to the men who molded many of these traditional relationships.
34. Private owners along the shore have since Roman times been held liable for
maintenance of the banks and of seawalls. Lord Hale, First Treatise (ca. 1786) (a manu.
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A final reason for the adoption of the easement approach, although
there is no proof that it was actually considered, was its usefulness
as a salami tactical method of returning to the old Roman position
of total common ownership. By gradually expanding the definition of
existing easements and by possibly adding others, it is quite possible
that the law could cause private ownership to fade away so completely
that the result would ultimately be equivalent to expropriationas
Should the salami tactic of returning tidal areas to common owmer-
ship by gradually expanding the scope of public easements on private
ownership prove successful, the many significant elements of the orig-
inal Roman approach that remain imbedded in the common law will
have been partly responsible. If the new dominant easement approach
proves incapable of such expansion or of providing adequate protection,
the currently recessive Roman theory (or its close relative, state owner-
ship for the benefit of the public) does provide a "principled" alter-
native to private ownership.
Notwithstanding widespread de facto alienation and doctrinal incon-
sistencies with the public trust easement theory,30 the alternative Roman
approach retained a footing within the common law over the centuries.
Even though the law was often forced to recognize that the shore had
been acquired by grant, prescription, or a combination of the two,37
both courts and academic writers continued to hold that it was prima
facie in the Crown.3s The Grown's interest, moreover, was widely per-
ceived to be the people's. In a close consideration of conflicting interests
in the Brighton seashore, for example, Mr. Justice Bayley held that
to the extent that tidal areas are the King's, they are held in trust for
script published in MooRE, FORSHORE 318, 360, 366.) [Hereinafter cited as HAx, FLrsr
35. That this is the direction towards which public policy beckons is suggested by
ORF. REV. STAT. § 390.610, which seeks "to forever preserve and maintain the sovereignty
of the state heretofore existing over the seashore and ocean beaches of the state ....
This statute claims to be based on public easements by prescription for recreational
purposes. Id. § 390.610(2), (3).
36. In England the alienation is explained by prescription and the theory of "lot
grants"; in the United States by prescription and the state governments' power of grant
and sale (especially if some public purpose can be certified or if, as in Maschu-setts.
public easements are retained). In 1641 the Massachusetts legislature granted the Colony's
shore down to the extreme low water mark to riparian owners subject to easements for
public passage, navigation, and fishing.
37. 2 BLACKSTONE, Co m,=Ams 220, 222; Simpson v. Corporation of Godmanchester,
73 LAw Ti.sss 90, 95 (1882). Moreover, Parliament has the power to extinguish the public
trust by grant or in any other way it sees fit. H. 'WooLRYcr, A TREPAnsE o.N Tim LAW OF
WATERs 272 (Phil. ed. 1853). cf. SCHULT.S, supra note 7, at 60.
38. HALE, D.J.M. 376, 378-79; GouLn 12-13. "By the present [1900] law of England, the
Crown has the right of property in the areas and inlets of the sea within the realm....
GoULD, supra note 1, at 8.
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the public.39 With the American Revolution, this sovereign representa-
tive proprietorship passed to the citizens of each state.4 0 One way of
"rediscovering" and developing this ancient Roman heritage would be
through traditional trust theory, following language in the important
Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois case 41 to the effect that "[t]he State can
no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are
[beneficially] interested ... than it can abdicate its police powver .... ,"42
E. Historical Summary
Before considering several aspects of the content and scope of the
contemporary common law of tidal areas, a brief overview of the cen-
turies of eddying doctrinal development discussed above may help clar-
ify the historical pattern. Figure 1 illustrates doctrinal history in rela-
tion to the ratio of demand for tidal resources to the supply.
Although the Roman model has never been entirely abandoned,
drastic changes in political, social, and commercial order during the
Dark Ages made the concept of common ownership of tidal resources
as a whole untenable. When commerce and the use of tidal areas began
to revive, the law followed by developing the easement public trust
model. Subsequently, as the demand for tidal area resources accelerated,
the public trust theory's armory of easements grew. This process was
held back during the laissez-faire period as theorists concentrated on
unseating unsatisfactory trustees in favor of private owners and the
Invisible Hand. 43 However, over the centuries the extent to which
39. "[1]n general, the crown has the right,-not with a view to the private reservation
to collect the stones for itself, or to collect the sand for itself, but for the general interest
of the public; and, if you can, without interfering with and prejudicing the interest of
the public, remove the sand and the stones, the crown will not interfere." Dickens v,
Shaw, (K.B. 1822), reproduced in HALL, supra note 9, Appendix xlv, ix. This case wa,I
fought between the traditional feudal Lord of the Manor, who claimed the shore but who
had not exercised use and control adequately to prove his claim, and various private
individuals who sought to defend their right to take sand and stones from the shore for
use in construction activity in the rapidly growing city of Brighton. The interests of
fishermen and swimmers were also raised. Such a conflict would not have arisen in an
earlier day when tidal resources were so plentiful that no profit could be had from
claiming and selling them and no serious conflict of uses was probable.
40. "For when the Revolution took place, the people of each state became themselves
sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters and
the soils under them for their own common use, subject only to the rights since sur-
rendered by the Constitution to the general government." Martin v. Waddel, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842). (Emphasis added.) This is a position not far removed in theory
from that of Roman common ownership.
41. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
42. Id. at 453. Such development is proposed in Berlin, Roisman & Kessler, Law In
Action: The Trust Doctrine, mimeo available from the Conservation Foundation, 1250
Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D.C. Prepared for the Conference on Law and the
Environment, Sept. 1969.
43. The Roman law made the foreshore common property and the state trustee. The
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the public's interests have been recognized in the law has correlated
directly with changes in the ratio of the demand to the supply of
tidal resources.
The current situation is unsatisfactory. The protection afforded the
public interest in tidal areas lags behind an exploding demand/supply
ratio. (See Figure 1). In part because of this lag, and in part because
of its history, tidal doctrine is over-complex, if not confused. It is
difficult for a "principle&' set of rules to be adequately flexible when
faced with rapidly changing conditions. Change is apparent, however,
and its direction is clear. From the time of Magna Charta public
interests in the foreshore have grown, and they have been increasingly
recognized in the law and protected by more adequate trusteeship ar-
rangements. This trend suggests that case by case cost-benefit balancing
may become more overt. Use of the Roman Model is a logical alter-
native to the easement doctrine, and one that may render superior
justice. Although the law is reluctant to admit making particular deri-
sions on cost-benefit grounds, it has established doctrines from period
to period with such considerations pre-eminently in mind. The greater
the restrictions on private ownership, with consequent reduction in
its rigidities, the greater scope there is for such balancing by the state
laissez-faire theorists wanted the foreshore to be held by private owners, albeit admitting
minimal easement restraints, and they would have eliminated the trustee entirely.
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as widely-empowered trustee (or owner). Trusteeship of a wide range
of rights (the expanded easement theory model) or trusteeship "in the
public interest" (moving towards the common ownership model), which
are the two most likely alternative lines of public trust development,
both leave the trustee with the duty to consider all relevant variables
in exercising a broad maximizing discretion. If one analogizes to
existing trust doctrines, the courts would intervene under such a system
only if the trustee was not maximizing the beneficiaries' interests (e.g.,
by ignoring important public interests currently protected by ease-
ments). That is to say that the state would be active trustee, and the
courts would require and enforce cost-benefit balancing by the state.
II. The Central Elements of the Common Law of the Foreshore
As the history of its development would suggest, the current law
of tidal areas is hardly a Cartesian product. It straddles different
and sometimes inconsistent goals; it has ill-defined boundaries; it en-
compasses more or fewer interests at different times and places; the
degree of enforcement varies depending upon the balance of interests
asserted, when, for whom, and where; and, as already mentioned, there
is considerable ambiguity regarding the state's role as trustee and
regulator. In the United States, moreover, there is almost anarchic
doctrinal diversity from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, 44 making general-
ized comment perilous. 45
In what follows we will try nonetheless to blueprint doctrinal pat-
terns in the complex common law of the foreshore. Our primary focus
will be on the extent of and balance between public and private in.
terests. We will also briefly consider how the American federal system
affects the question of "Who is the public?", and we will conclude
with an even shorter review of the remedies traditionally available
when the public trust is infringed.
44. For a summary of the law in each of the original thirteen colonies, see Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 18 et seq. (1893). For a consideration of the current state of general
public trust law in Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and California, see Sax, supra note 5, at
491.
45. "[Tlhere is no universal and uniform law upon the subject; . . . each State has
dealt with the lands under the tide waters within its borders according to its own views
of justice and policy .... Great caution, therefore, is necessary in applying precedents In
one state to cases arising in another." Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1893). "But In most
of the Atlantic States, the common law doctrine has been in some respects very materially
altered and modified by Statutes, grants and usage." ANGELL, Tree WA'rrgs 49.
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A. The Grounds for and the Extent of Private Interests
In today's developed society, the most common method of acquiring
a property interest is from a prior owner. Such a vendor may be either
a person or a government acting as a private ouer. Unfortunately
many governments have confused their roles as private owner and
sovereign trustee of public interests and have attempted to give or sell
portions of their trusteeship powers along with alienable interests. Al-
though some such distributions have since been sanctified by judicial
myth-making 6 and/or by prescription,4 7 they are theoretically invalid.48
Where courts and commentators have refused to let time justify such
excessive distributions, 49 this refusal is based both on considerations of
public policy and, at least for the easement of free navigation, on the
exercise of a right uninterrupted since the period of Roman common
ownership.5 0 Even if the uncertainty created by such possibly faulty
initial transfers of title from government is not immediately involved,
to trace private title back to prior private ownership, however, does
not provide sure justification for the original transfer into private
hands. Not only does such an attempted defense of private interests
fail to deal with the difficult historical fact of Roman common owner-
ship, but it does not explain the creation of new interests in already-
claimed tidal areas or the claiming of abandoned or previously unclaimed
areas, notably in the New World.51
Gradually, the common law has come to recognize the weaknesses
of this justification for private alienation and consequently to emphasize
46. See p. 776 infra.
47. See p. 776 infra.
48. "Public rights, and such things as are materially related to them, are unalienable,
and this important doctrine was established by the early lawyers. The rule laid don by
Bracton is that things which relate peculiarly to the public good cannot be given, sold,
or transferred by the king to another person, or separated from the crown . . . The
same rule was admitted by the feudal law." SCH ULTEs, supra note 7, at 10. [N].ot.ithstand-
ing a grant, if the public interest be invaded, or the privileges of the people narrowed,
the grant pro tanto is void .... " WoomYcu, supra note 37, at 449. See also Att'y Gen.
v. Parmeter, 10 Price 378 (1811). But cf. Sax's warning that many such statements in
American state cases have been statements of judicial philosophy and not holdings. Sax,
supra note 5, at 473, 485-86.
49. "[No length of time will legitimate a public nuisance, so that the acquiescence of
twenty years on the part of the public in an interruption of their rights, occasioned by
the illegal act of an individual, will not divest these rights, nor prevent the community
from proceeding to abate or remedy the nuisance under which they may chance to suffer."
WooLR cH, supra note 37, at 206.
50. "When a nuisance concernes immediately al men, as the obstruction of a port, the
makeinge of a weare in a publique river; this can neither bee licensed or dispenced with,
though the Kinge and the owner of the soil of the river should consent thereunto, by-caus
it is immediatly a common nusance, and all are directly or immediatly concerned in it."
HALE, FMSr Tax.Tns 340.
51. See pp. 771-72 supra.
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prescription increasingly. The common law allowed private prescription
(and recognized ancient grants reinforced by use), albeit initially only
of incorporeal rights (e.g., a right of way as versus title),62 by creating
the elaborate fictions of usage from time immemorial (i.e., from at
least the reign of Richard I), or of a "lost grant" of equal antiquity.6A
The requirements of great antiquity, logically impossible for the United
States, have gradually been dropped even from the fictions. Now twenty
years prescription in general and sixty years against the state is all
that is generally required for private alienation. Similarly the limita-
tion to incorporeal rights, based on the early formalistic concept of
seisin,54 is now little more than an historic shadow. Lands and rights
long held by individuals, and generally improved by them, are in fair-
ness and public policy better found to be theirs than the property of
long neglecting paper owners. 5
The rule of thumb applicable to prescription under the more
modern common law has been that the citizen could gain by "user"
whatever there was in the tidal area that was not reserved for the
people by easement under the public trust theory.50 Acts of ownership
that have been held to provide the basis for prescriptive title include
building embankments and filling in parts of the shore, building
wharves, piers, access ramps, etc.57 Thus, those claiming to own tidal
areas, unless they previously had long allowed the grant lands (or part
of them) to lie idle, 8 have a solid claim to whatever they have actively
52. 2 BLACMKrONE, COMMENTARIES 220-23.
53. 1 BLACKStONE, COwIoENTARiEs 75; 2 id. at 220; Simpson v. Godmanchester, 73
LAw T s 90, 92 et seq. (1882); Dalton v. Angus, 44 LAv TiMEs 407. Cf. State ex Vel.
Thornton v. Hay, 89 Ore. 887, 897 n.5 & 899-900 (1969).
54. See, e.g., HALL, supra note 9, at 37-38; J. JERWOOD, A DISSERTATION ON THE RkIoTS
TO THE SEA SHORES AND TO THE SOIL AND BED OF TIDAL HARnORS AND NAVIGABLE R sV
30-31 (1850).
55. See pp. 769-70 supra.
56. "A subject that hath not the franchis of the port, yet lice may by usage and
prescription have the very soyl and channel of a navigable river, creeke, or chamnnel
wherin the sea flowes and reflowes, nay though it bee constantly salt water at low water
... ." HALE, FiRsT TREATISE, supra note 34, at 353. See also HALE, Dr Por TIius MARIS,
Ch. IV.
"Mhe king is lord of all the land between high and low-water mark; ...and there
are instances [in addition to royal grants of such land) in which this right is obtained,
not from grants from the king, but by long prescription." Dickens v. Shaw, (K.B. 1822),
reproduced in HALL, Appendix.
57. MooRE, FoREsHoRE 660.
58. Grantees of tidal area lands or rights run a double risk if they long let their
grants be idle--first that of failing to add prescriptive insurance to their title, and second
and more serious, that of voiding their original grant. Three important cases concerning
improvements (a drydock and wharf) made on the shore of Portsmouth Harbour and
concluding in an order to abate these investments turned on the long gap that had taken
place between the start of construction in 1785 and the grant made in 1628-evdn though
the harm to the harbor was minimal. The Crown had, the court held, made the grant
with the implied condition of certain improvements being made, which were not done
within a reasonable time. The long lapse of time was "not what the Crown expected
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possessed that does not conflict with pubic trust easements, irrespec-
tive of the validity of the original grant.59 There are, however, certain
limits to the prescriptive rights thus allowed. °0 The requirement of
adequate user, consistent with any controlling grant, is the dearer of the
two main limitations on prescription. The other-that certain interests
reserved to the public cannot be alienated into private ownership in
any way-is a morass of confusion.
B. The Competing Public Interests
public trust theory. They are: navigation; ports; free passage (as a means
At least ten different categories of interest in tidal areas have been
claimed at one time or another to be protected for the people under
when it contemplated that there should be an undertaking and attempt .... " Att'y
Gen. v. Parmeter, 10 Price 378, 407 (1822). See also id. at 405-11; Att'y Gen. v. Burridge,
10 Price 350 (1822); Att'y Gen. v. Richards, 2 Arstruther 603. These cases specifically
limited their holding to one part of a much larger grant which included portions that
the courts indicated would not be overturned. If portions of large land grants made to
private owners were left similarly undeveloped until relatively recently, the grant might be
considered voided as regards those portions on the grounds that the gran t was made with
an understood developmental purpose and condition and that this condition wmas not met.
For conservationists or others seeking to overturn old grants (made with abandon in earlier
frontier days by the American state legislatures, generally with the intent of encouraging
development), this implied condition theory is attractive because it allows the courts to
reach the desired conclusion without forcing them to do anything more drastic in terms
of "making law" than interpreting specific old statutes that have no significance broader
than the title in controversy.
Further, by tracing back the common law theory of "lost grant" upon which prescrip-
tion is supposedly based, one can challenge even prescriptive daims based on ancient and
continuous use if the claim is to a right or use dearly inconsistent with the authorizing
grant. Thus, for example, a mill could not enforce a claim based on long use to water
from a British canal because the act creating the canal specified that it was to serve a
public purpose while the miller's use was private. Rochdale Canal Co. v. Radcliffe, I8Q.B. 287. If, or to the degree that, private tidal property owners argue prescription as a
basis for their claims, their theory is a common law theor based on the fiction of last
grant. [Intervening illegitimate grants do not affect the validity of this mythical original
grant. Simpson v. Corporation of Godmanchester, 73 LAW Tatts 90 (1882).] If the prop-
erty in question is in a port, this lost grant would have to conform to the special
limitations imposed on all grants of ports (of which more below). Blackstone descibes
one of the most important of these restrictions as follows: "But though the king had a
power of granting the franchise of havens and ports, yet le had not the power of re-
sumption, or of narrowing and confining their limits when once established but any
person had a right to load or discharge his merchandise in any part of the haven . ... "
1 BLACESTONE, Cosm craims 234. See also Dickens v. Shaw (K.B. 1822), quoted supra note
39'
59. There is some question whether prescriptive claims can extend beyond the lour
water mark. On the theory that since these lands are never dry and hence never available
for prescriptive use, Woolrych suggests that these lands are not subject to prescription.
WooLRYcHr, supra note 37, at 54. However, Lord Hale, speaking for what is now majority
opion, suggests that this soil can in fact be occupied, e.g., by weirs, and that it is
therefore susceptible of prescription. HALE, DJ.M., supra note 1, at 3S9; see also Benest v.
Pipon, 1 Knapp P.C. 60 (1829), holding that there can be no exclusive right to seaweed
(considered an incident of the soil) below low water without a royal grant or prolonged
user. If there is any doubt about the possibility of ownership below low water facing the
open sea, however, there is little question regarding the permissibility of prescription in
harbors, bays, and other enclosed (inter fauces terrae) bodies of the sea. H , F=r
TRATMs, 352.
60. See note 58 supra.
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to another protected activity); commerce; fishing; sand and stones; sea-
weed and shells; 61 bathing (recreation); conservation and aesthetics; and
the "public interest".
Public trust theory characterizes a given right either as being fully
protected or as not being protected at all. A brief consideration of the
variety of interests potentially involved should cast instant doubt on
the viability of this approach. By and large, the above list encompasses
a series of possibly protected activities and rights, many of which are
likely to conflict. For example, completely unrestricted exercise of free
navigation and commercial use will almost certainly conflict with bath-
ing, conservation, fishing and sometimes even with the collection of
seaweed and stones. An ordering of priorities is necessary between the
different rights as well as vis-a-vis other claims. The different claimed
rights have different social weights. Thus, the right to unencumbered
navigation will usually assume a higher value than the right to collect
seaweed on the shore. The weights can be debated, and they will change
as social conditions change; 62 but they are indisputably not all equal.
The fact that the rights involved are not homogeneous or of equal
weight, while the public trust theory suggests that they are, leads to
confusion. 63 This confusion is compounded by the fact that some of
the lesser rights have at times been officially protected, while at other
times they have not; and that even the core rights, which have always
61. Important primarily for use as fertilizer.
62. For example, the importance of conservation/aesthetics and of bathing/recreation
are no doubt both greater and better recognized now than at Lord Hale's time.
63. Can, for example, a several fishery arise from user? Or Is the public right of
fishery one of the rights inalienably reserved for the people in common? On the one
hand the public right of fishery is constantly mentioned In the same breath with the un.
deniably inalienable right of free navigation in most lists of what is covered under the
public trust (see, e.g., Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 413 (1842); Brinckman v.
Mattey, 2 Chancery Division 313, 315 (1904); ANMELL, Twe WATErts 21, and there are many
important authorities that say directly that it is so protected. ANCELL, TIM WA1EPS, 21;
HALL, supra note 9, at 42; ScHuTras, supra note 7, at 10. But see Moona & Moona', Fsu-
ErEs, passim. In the words of Huddleston, D.: "[Tjhe whole current of authorities i
this country and in Ireland [is] that, when a river is navigable and tidal the public have
a right to fish there as well as to navigate it . Pearce v. Scotcher, 9 Q.B.D. 162
(1882).
If fishery is protected by the public trust equally with navigation, then It nhust follow
that several fisheries cannot be acquired by prescription. However: "But though an
exclusive right of fishing in the sea and navigable streams cannot be established by
grant.... yet we find many instances of such a right being established by fircscriptioi
.. " SCHULTES 68-69.
This outburst of apparent theoretical madness, however, cannot in fairness be blaned
on prescription theory. The confusion lies instead in public trust theory, which has
never clearly defined what rights, in what degree, it covers. If fishery was in fact a':
dearly and fully protected by the public trust theory as is the right to nihhldecd
navigation, there would be no question of individuals being able to prescribe exclusive
several fisheries.
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been encompassed by the theory, have been enforced with differing
degrees of rigor from time to time.04
The different degrees of enforcement (and implied importance) that
have been associated with various protected "public trust" rights (and
thus the implied importance of these rights) can best be comprehended
with the help of a table. Note that even with its broad classifications
there is room for variation-thus, for example, what is navigable can be
defined in terms of rowboats at high spring tides or in terms of modem
ocean liners.65
TABLE I
TmAL PuBarc T usr Rxowrs(as measured by degree and scope of enforcement)
I Maximum Low
A. Point at which Absolute Jury Balancing. Threatened
hindrance of standard. determination Jury extnguhshment
the right can Any infringement if any infringement question of of prolected
cause judicial or change of (nuisance). No nuisance but right required
inten'ention status quo ante offetting offetting before court




B. Beneficiaries All people All National Provindal Local
protected Citizens or State Cutlon ary
Citizens Ue s
C. Waterways All, including All tidal All In ports
where the right non-navigable & and navigable tidal only
is protected. non-tidal
Public trust theory has not adequately protected all of its proper
interests because of its failure to give consistent theoretical meaning to
the word "absolute" when it is used to characterize different easements.
"Absolute" can have, and persistently has had, several different mean-
ings in the public trust context. Oversimplifying and temporarily ig-
noring overlap, there are roughly three different ways in which public
trust easements can be "absolute".
(1) One particular right may be singled out as being absolute
(generally navigation). Of necessity, no other interest logically
can be absolute at the same time. However, several important
interests can be ranked hierarchically--with number two
being "absolute" except when in conflict with number one,
64. See Figure 1, p. 773 supra. They have also been enforced differently from place
to place. For example, one can fish in many non-navigable mters, but the law docsn't
protect the angler if the area is either tidal or navigable. See, e.g., People v. Plait, 17
Johnson Rep. 195. Similarly, the whole emphasis on spedal added protection in ports
(see infra) is based on just such geographic differentiation.
65. Compare Parmeter v. Gibbs, 10 Price 412, 422 (1813) (a rowboat at high tides)
with Shaw, C.J., in Rowe v. Granite Bridge Corporation, 21 Pick. 344 (1839) (must be
navigable for purposes useful to trade and agriculture). See also Sax, supra note 5,
at 556, and Collins v. Gerhardt, 237 Mich. 38 (1926).
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and so on. Other interests may be protected by non-easement
(e.g., local custom) means, or they may be denied protection
altogether.
(2) Absolute is used synonymously with unextinguishable. There
is no set rule regarding priority when interests clash, but
public trust easements cannot be ignored or extinguished.
(3) The package of all public trust interests is absolute vis-a-vis
any and all conflicting private interests, but the balance be-
tween conflicting public easements must be struck on a case
by case basis.
Model (1) historically has been the most widely used. This has been
so because, for a limited number of easements, it provides the surest,
the most predictable, and the most mechanical guide to judicial ac-
tion.6 However, this usage can have ill effects. For example, certain
"lesser" protections will be defined as separate from the public trust
theory so they may co-exist logically alongside the greater protections."1
More seriously, the courts may be over-cautious in recognizing impor-
tant public interests in tidal areas because they feel that recognition
would entail protecting the interest to the same degree as the prototype
(and most vigorously defended) public trust theory right-navigation.
As more interests are taken into consideration, as they have been and
will have to be in our increasingly congested environment, the mech-
anistic advantages of this first use of "absolute" turn increasingly into
costly rigidities that distort the weighing process for doctrinal reasons.
This inadequacy has led the law to slide somewhat over to Models (2)
and (3), neither of which provides formulae solutions to cases. Espe-
cially to the extent that Model (3) "public" easements are defined to
include most legitimate private interests, 8 this shift represents a re-
luctant and somewhat covert movement by the courts towards greater
case by case cost-benefit analysis.
For those who believe in the need for greater protection of the pub-
lic's interest in the foreshore, Model (3), the public trust package,
promises better results than Model (2). In either case most regulation
will be done by the executive.6 9 While Model (2) requires in theory
66. The public trust theory's failure to differentiate between, and settle upon, any
of several possible meanings of "absolute" can probably best be explained in terms of the
easy analogy made between public trust "easements" and the familiar property concept
of the stame name and concerned with very similar object matter. (See TAN 5L supra.]
The courts' reluctance to indulge in overt cost-benefit analysis has no doubt dis-
couraged attempts to pierce the analogy. See also Sax, supra note 5, at 478 ct sJeq.
67. See p. 784 infra.
68. See, e.g., p. 783 infra.
69. See, e.g., p. 785 infra.
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that public trust easements be considered, it seems to leave injured
members of the public with the virtually impossible burden of proving
that the executive did not consider their easement rights in arriving at
particular decisions. Model (3) by contrast creates a presumption that
the public interest will be recognized, leaving the injured member
of the public with the much easier task of showing that his public
right has been violated and placing on the state the burden of proving
an over-riding public interest. Moreover, Model (3) keeps much more
widely open the option of an eventual return to Roman common
ownership by means of the already discussed gradual, "salami tactic"
reduction of private interests in the foreshore." The main disadvantage
of Model (3) is the danger that it might lead society to reach resource
allocation decisions underweighing private interests. However, under
present circumstances, the danger that acceptance of Model (2) might
leave important public interests without effective judicial recourse seems
more grave.
C. A Catalogue of Public Trust Themy Easements
A brief catalogue7' will serve to illustrate the preceding generalities
regarding the variety of interests involved and to suggest traditional
and currently dominant views of the status of claimed public rights,
including their prospects for future growth.
Navigation. The oldest and most completely developed of the rights,
the right to navigation, is dearly an easement. In Lord Hale's words,
waterways "are in nature of comon highwayes, in which all the Kinges
people have a liberty of passage .... .,-2 The easement includes sec-
ondary easements, such as the right to anchor,73 but the old right to
tow from the banks was ended by Ball v. Herbert." Of all the public
trust rights, navigation is the only one that has remained unchallenged
and rigorously enforced75 from Roman times to the present.
In dealing with impediments to navigation, no countervailing bene-
fits will be considered. In an opinion ordering the abatement of an
embankment and wharf built on a recess of the Thames that was
"not covered with water for eighteen hours out of the twenty-four,"70
70. See p. 771 supra.
71. See pp. 777-78 supra.
72. HArx, FRsr TREATISE 339. See also Orr Ewing v. Colquhoun, 2 App. Cases 839
(1877).
73. Gann v. Free Fishers, 11 H.L. 192, 217-19 (1865).
74. 3 T.R. 253 (1789).
75. The introduction of evidence regarding the obstruction of navigation has been
favored under some circumstances. King v. Clark, 12 Mod. 615 (1701).
76. Rex v. Lord Grosvenor, 2 Starkie 511, 513 (1819).
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the court held that evidence of favorable effects Qf the alteration was
irrelevant, "The question here is, whether a public right has not been
infringed."7 Similarly, in Regina v. Randall, the court instructed the
jury to say
whether the wharf itself occasioned any hinderance or impediment
whatever to the navigation of the river by any description of vessels
or boats; and told them that they were not to take into their con-
sideration the circumstance that a benefit had resulted to the gen-
eral navigation of the river .... 78
Some courts have used language suggesting that any hindrance to
navigation in whatever degree is ipso facto prohibited. The court's use
of the word "whatever" in the above quote from Randall provides one
such example. However, it is clear that this is not a universal rule 0
and that in any case Parliament, Congress, or a state legislature can
authorize improvements that adversely affect navigation.80 The degree
of absoluteness with which the right to free navigation is enforced is
one of the few ambiguities and variables associated with the right.
Ports. The right of the public in ports is closely connected and
similar to its right to free navigation, except that it is policed even
more vigorously8 l and that it gives particular stress to unhindered
access to shore facilities for loading and unloading. Lord Hale lists
several nuisances particular to ports, including silting or clogging a
harbor with rubbish, wrecks, anchors, etc.; allowing the decay of landing
facilities such as wharfs; the building of weirs or other impediments to
navigation and moorage in a harbor; and the building out of a port
into areas where ships previously could moor8 2
Passage. Citizens generally have the right of passage over the shore
when passage is connected with protected rights, notably the rights of
navigation and fishing.83 Otherwise the property rights of private
77. Xd. at 513. The Corporation of London as conservator of the river had appvovcd
the change.
78. Regina v. Randall, 2 CARR. & M. 606, 607 (1842). See also Parmeter v. Gibbs, I0
Price 412, 419, 42 (1822); Rex v. Ward, 4 Ad. & El. $84 (1836); Respublica Y. Caldwell,
1 U.s. (1 Dallas) 150 (1785).
79. HALE, DE PORTIBUS MAlus 85. Moreover, the law is very cear that the right of
free navigation may not be pursued to the harm of' other interests unnecessarily. Post
v. Munn, 1 Southard 61 (1818); GouLD, supra note 1, at 178.
80. GouLD 47 & 275; WooLRYchr, supra note 37, at 271.
81. HALE, Fis. T.aws 345; IJALE. Dz FORTIBuS MAR& chs. 2, 3, 6 and 7.
82. HALE, DE POrTIBus MAR1S, ch. 7. See also 1 BLACXSrONE, COMMENTARMS 234. The
cases do not seem to follow the comnmeptators in treating ports specially, but rather deal
with obstructions under the general right of navigation rule. See, c,., the Portsmouth
Harbor cases, note 58 supra.
83. "As incident to the right of public fishery in tidal waters there exists thL right
of fishing over the foreshore when it is not within the limits of a several fishery, antI of
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owners take precedence.8 4 One could argue from a few minority sources
and the general rule that grants from the sovereign of trust property
will be construed narrowly to pass only what is specifically grantedsa
and that a right of passage over the seashore was retained as such for
the general public. The Massachusetts Act of 1641 granting property
ownership of the shore to riparian owners specifically retained a public
easement of access over unimproved shorefront8 0
Commerce. American cases referring to the public trust theory
usually list navigation, commerce, and fishery as the three exemplary
ingredients. Although there were some suggestions of this idea in the
older common law,8 7 they were hardly stressed. Since "commerce in-
cludes navigation,"8' the added category may be considered primarily
an enlargement, with potential for expansion, of the closely related
concept of navigation. However, its very breadth limits its probable
impact; courts will presumably be reluctant to restrict one commercial
interest for the benefit of another. About all it dearly and logically
excludes is an interfering private holding that prevents any use.
Fishery. The right to fish is a public right subject to private invasion,
primarily by prescription although initially in early England also in
large degree by grant.88 In case of conflict with the right of navigation,
the latter is paramount90
The status of the right to fishery has long been one of the most
uncertain areas of the public trust theory. In large part this has been
laying lines, drawing nets (not being of the nature of fixed engines) over it, and pre-
sumably of drawing nets on the beach above ordinary high water mark in the act of
fishing. It does not extend to the right of fixing stakes or fixed engines on the foreshore
nor of drawing up boats above high water mark (except in case of peril and necessity),
and leaving them there for future use. Such rights would be inconsistent with the right
of private property." MooRE 8: MooRE, FisHEPJs, 96. The Oregon Supreme Court has
recently held that the "dry sand area" above the tidal area proper is by long custom a
"recreational adjunct" of the foreshore area, open to the public both for pleasure and
for access to the foreshore proper. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 59 Ore. 897, 890-91
(1969). The old Roman law had defined the seashore as running up to "the limit of the
highest winter flood" (JusMrAN INsInTuTs 2.1.1) and not just the mean high tide gen.
erally accepted by the common law. Thus Thornton, even though continuing to recognize
the old mean high tide line in its argument, seems to move substantively clor to the
Roman position in its definition of the area subject to public rights as well as in its
recognition of a public interest in recreation.
84. Blundell v. Catterall, 5 B. 9- Ald. 268 (1821).
85. People v. California. Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 597, 138 P. 79 (1918).
86. GouuD, supra note 1, at 332-36.
87. For example, although the King is not allowed to issue duplicative franchises
for markets or ferries, "yet in the case of a port of the sea, bycause that is a franchise
of a more publique concernement .... to the realme in respect of safeguard and com-
merce here; though the subject hath a port, yet the Kinge may, as it seemes, erect another
port neare to the former .. HALE, FnsT TREATis 351.
88. Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865).
89. HALx, DJ.M. 376, 386-87; MooRE, FoPsHOan 285.
911. MooP 9 Mooan, FuHisms 89; 1 KNr, Commvnsn~rms 489.
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due to the ambiguity regarding the relationship between the right to
fish and the ownership of the underwater soil. Is the right an easement 1
or a profit of the soil?92 Or, does the existence of the right raise a
presumption of the ownership of the soil and vice versa?93
Sand, Gravel, Shellfish and Seaweed. Where the soil remains in the
sovereign, the people have a right to use it, especially when sanctioned
in so doing by custom. 4 When the soil is vested in a private party,
he has an exclusive right to the soil and what grows upon it.95 Unlike
seaweed still attached to the soil, some authorities allow the public
a right to collect drift seaweed not on private property. 0
Bathing (Recreation). In the case of Blundell v. Catterall,7 the
previously open question whether there was a common law right to
swim was decided in the negative, and access across a privately owned
shore for this purpose was forbidden.98 One reason given by the court
was that swimming could conflict with navigation and fishery, and
that it should have the lowest priority. Moreover, Lord C. J. Abbott
noted that "public convenience is, in all cases, to be viewed with a
due regard to private property .. . ."00 This exclusion from common
law protection of an ancient and universal customary right is a prime
example of the needless exclusion of an activity. Although swimming
was not felt to be important enough to warrant the same degree of
protection that was provided navigation and fishery, local custom often
effectively reserved this right for particular sets of people,100 as long as
it did not conflict with priority public interests such as navigation.101
91. COKE, CoKE UPON LrrrLoN § 122a (8th ed. 1822); HALL, supra note 9, at 55
et seq., 74.
92. MooRE & MooRE, FIsHEIuEs 26.
93. Duke of Devonshire v. Neill, 2 L.RIr. 132, 171, 8 A.C. 152 (1877).
94. Dickens v. Shaw (K.B. 1822), quoted at note 39 supra. However, some such uses, for
example dredging for shells, may conflict with other public trust interests commanding
higher priority, for example fishery. See, e.g., Sax, supra note 5, at 553 et seq.
95. Martin v. Waddell, 41 US. (16 Pet.) 367, 421 (1842) (oysters); MooRE, F omisHop
656. But see HALL, supra note 9, at 210.
96. GourD, supra note 1, at 55 et seq. Drifting seaweed is the source of legal uncer-
tainty for much the same reason that fish are-it is unclear what its relation if any Is
to the soil.
97. 106 Eng. Rep. 1191, 5 B. & Aid. 268 (1821).
98. Followed in Brinckman v. Matley, 2 Chancery Div. 313 (1904).
99. Blundell v. Catterall, 106 Eng. Rep. 1191, 5 B. & Aid. 268, 284 (1821).
100. On the Thames, the Westminster School boys had just such a customary right.
In State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 89 Ore. 887 (1969), the Oregon Supreme Court ex-
panded the doctrine of customary usage to cover general public use of the "dry sand"
area for specifically recreational purposes. The Court took particular note of the fact that
the custom had been viewed historically as limited in application to much less extensive
and better defined groups of beneficiaries than "the public." Id. at 900 n.6. Nevertheless, It
chose custom rather than prescription as the grounds for its holdings because the latter,
when strictly construed, could not be generalized to the entire seashore where tie
former could. Id. at 897.
101. On another part of the Thames, the court found that boys swimming could be
784
Vol. 79: 762, 1970
The Public Trust in Tidal Areas
The increased need for recreational facilities along the shore has
generated considerable pressure to reverse Blundell. Oregon has seized
the customary usage opening and widened it.102
In 1967 the importance of recreational and other non-navigational
factors was recognized by the federal government. Previously the Army
Corps of Engineers, required to pass on all projects possibly affecting
navigable waters under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,103 con-
sidered the impact of proposed projects on navigability almost exclu-
sively. In 1967 the regulations governing the granting of permits were
modified as follows:
The decision as to whether a permit will be issued will be pred-
icated upon the effects of permitted activities on the public interest
including effects upon water quality, recreation, fish and wildlife,
pollution, our natural resources, as well as the effects on naviga-
tion .. .. 104
Conservation and Aesthetics. The public interest in consenation is
another area in which one can expect growth of the public trust theory.
With the end of the frontier the need is obvious-and the job will not
require judicial legislating. Almost all the elements of a public trust
right of conservation in tidal areas have long existed, because it has
long been recognized that adequate conservation is a necessary pre-
requisite to the enjoyment of protected activities. To quote Lord Hale
once again:
Generally that which stopps the port or shokes it up, as castinge out
of filth or ballast or othervise, obstructs the passage of ships.., or
stoppinge up a channel or rode ... are prima facie nuisances.035
a nuisance to navigation. Rex v. Lord Grosvenor, 2 Starkie 511, 514 (1819). (Lord Abbott,
C.J., again).
102. The Legislative Assembly recognizes that over the years the public has made
frequent and uninterrupted use of lands abutting, adjacent, and contiguous to the
public highways and state recreation areas and recognizes, further, that where such
use has been suficient to create easements in the public through dedication, prescrip-
tion, grant, or otherwise, that it is in the public interest to protect and preserve
such public easements as a permanent part of Oregon's recreational resources.
Ore. Rev. Stat. § 590.610(2).
Ownership of the shore of the Pacific Ocean between ordinary high tide and ex-
treme low tide, and from the Oregon and Washington state line on the north to
the Oregon and California state line on the south, excepting such portions as may
have been disposed of by the state prior to July 5, 1947, is vested in the State of
Oregon, and is declared to be a state recreation area ....
Ore. Rev. Stat. § 890.720. See also State ex rel Thornton v. Hay, n. 100 supra.
103. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-03 (1899).
104. 33 C.F.R. § 209.880 [emphasis added]. But see Zabel v. Tabb, 296 F. Supp. 76
(M.D. Fla. 1969).
105. HALE, Fnisr TRATrSE 888.
785
The Yale Law Journal
In the United States, Congress recognized the importance of such in-
direct as well as direct threats to "anchorage and navigation" in the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.100 Furthermore, under the common
law individuals found guilty of injuring or removing a natural barrier
against the sea were guilty of an indictable offense.1'0 In the Portsmouth
Harbor cases, one of the Crown's two primary grounds for claiming
that the wharf and associated improvements built on the harbor shore
were nuisances was that if continued these improvements would
prejudice the aforesaid moorings, and would also be an obstruction
to a quantity of water proportionable to their dimensions coming
into and going out of the said harbour on each flux and reflux of
the tide, and thereby prevent a great scouring and cleaning of the
lower part of the channel of the said harbour .... 108
The King's regulatory jurisdiction over the realm's waterways was even
referred to as a "jurisdiction of conservancy," and the officers he ap.
pointed or that delegated towns appointed to supervise this work were
known as "conservators."
Conservation is necessary not only as an adjunct of the right to free
navigation, but also to the maintenance of fisheries, any right of bathing
and recreation that may exist, commerce (tourism) and the public inter-
est in seaweed and seashells. The theory was raised in the 1928 Califor-
nia case Boone v. Kingsbury.00 The court held for the oil-drilling party
in this early case primarily on the ground that the possible loss was
counterbalanced by "the public benefit that will accrue to the common-
wealth by the developing of the oil and other mineral wealth which lie
beneath submerged lands . . . ."10 J. Shenk dissented in part on the
conservancy grounds proposed."'
The "Public Interest." It is a rare court that would admit to using
such a vague criterion as the "public interest" to determine fare-
shore disputes. This is a job best left to the legislature.112 However, the
public trust rights, as we have seen, are supposed to take precedence
106. 33 U.S.C. § 307 (1899).
107. Ball v. Herbert, 3 T.R. 253, 262 et seq. (1789); Gouw, supra note 1, at 174.
See also note 34 supra.
108. Att'y Gen. v. Parmeter, 10 Price 378, 382-83 (1822). See also related cases citcd
in note 58 supra,
109. 206 Cal. 148, 273 P. 797 (1928).
110. 206 Cal. at 193, 273 P. at 817. This sort of balancing approach Invites briefs
detailing all the harm caused by pollution, and waterfront decay.
111. 206 Cal. at 195, 197-98, 273 P. at 817-19.
112. 206 Cal. at 192, 273 P. at 812. "It was never doubted that an act of Parliament
would operate to extinguish any public right of passage, whether by land or water ...
WoouRnar, supra note 37, at 272.
786
Vol. 79: 762, 1970
The Public Trust in Tidal Areas
over other claims to the use of tidal resources, and it is the courts' duty
to enforce and administer this priority. Moreover, as we have also seen,
the existence of each of these rights is based on cost-benefit calculations
which the courts have made. Finally, as the public trust theory expands
and becomes less rigid in its categorizations, it will be dealing more
and more with determining the public interest, which need not be as
fearful as it sounds if it is conceptualized as a package of rights that have
been found to deserve special priority from Greek and Roman times?1' 3
D. Who is "The Public?"
One important ambiguity in the public trust theory in the United
States revolves around the question of "Trust for Whom?" Is the public
local would-be users, state citizens, or all nationals? In England a pecu-
liar local customary usage, even if not a general easement under the
trust, was often protected," 4 but the trust was impliedly national.",
The confusion came primarily in America. The original grants were
made to each of the different colonies, which, even after Independence,
retained title to the soil.116 In the words of the Illinois Central R.R.
case, "It is a title held in trust for the people of the State .... "1 The
Constitution, however, seems to require that the trust be in favor of
all United States citizens, at least regarding commerce and navigation"8
and, under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, n1 more generally.12 0
113. Compare our list of proposed areas of protected public rights in the tidelands
with Justinian's brief description quoted above in the text associated with note 8, supra.
He specifically says that the interests in ports, navigation, free passage, commerce, fishing,
and recreation ["retreat'] belong to the Roman citizen. Although he does not mention
sand and seaweed, it is clear that they could be no one's private property. but rather
belonged to all Romans in common. If Roman citizens had these rights, why shouldn't
we?
114. Howe v. Stawell, Alcock 9- Nap. 348 (1833), e.g., makes it clear that the taking
of seaweed from the shore is "a liberty which may . .. [be] beneficial, and which may
be established by local custom, but can be legally claimed for all the King's subjects,
or any portion of them, [only] by virtue of such local custom, and not as being part of
the common law." See also HALL, supra note 9, at 878.
115. Scotland, however, retained its oun law.
116. ANGELL, TIDE WVATERs 52.
117. 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
118. U.S. Const., art. 1, § 8; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724 (1865).
119. U.S. Const., art. IV, § 2.
120. Or, as it is expressed by Lord Hall, "the fus privatum of the proprietor is
subject to the jus publicum of the community." So the jus privatum of each State
in its tide waters (or in other words the right of property therein conferred by the
charters) is subject to the jus publicum of the United States, which is a free and
uninterrupted passage for all the citizens of the United States.
ANGELL, TeIE WATERS, 51-52. See also the dissent of justice Spence in Mallon v. City
of Long Beach, 44 Cal. 2d 199, 215, 282 P.2d 481, 490 (1955):
Some things nevertheless appear certain. First that the State of California was itself
a trustee rather than a trustor in relation to any trust imposed upon such tidelands,
and that the beneficiaries of such trust were not alone the People of this state but
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The identity of the trust beneficiary is, in other words, still clouded but
at least to some degree national in scope. Regulation is concurrent, with
the federal interest dominant. Although alienation of a state's property
interest is unobjectionable (as long as it is considered jus privatum), it
does seem that any such alienation, especially if linked to changes that
will be in any way detrimental to existing public interest easements,
should be interpreted narrowly by the courts in order to minimize
possible infringement of federal rights. Alienation is, after all, both
permanent and qualitatively somewhat different from regulation.
If a state holds the lands as jus privatum on the theory of having
succeeded to the Crown's title, then it should logically be bound by
both the long-standing limitations on grants by the Crown"-" and the
dominant requirement of not offending the public trust of the nation's
citizens. If it holds them as representative of the sovereign (state)
citizenry,122 then any action it takes must be justified both in terms of
the state citizens' general welfare and also of the national population's
not necessarily coincidental but certainly pre-eminent "easement"
interests.123
E. Public Trust Remedies
Violations of the public's rights in the foreshore are nuisances
that can be challenged by the state and/or affected citizens and are
subject to damages, injunction, and/or (especially) abatement.1 24 Tra-
ditionally if a structure were to be erected in tidal navigable waters
and were either a purpresture 2 or a nuisance against the public under
traditional common law, it would be "liable to indictment, and to a
private action in favor of individuals who sustain an injury distinct
from that suffered by the other members of the public."120 Whether a
particular use of the foreshore is a nuisance is a question of fact for
jury decision.127
all the people of the United States. Thus it has been indicated that the federal gov-
ernment could enforce such trust [emphasis added].
121. See, e.g., pp. 767-68 supra.
122. See p. 772 supra.
123. The Roman common ownership was, as a matter of natural law, in all manklnd.
124. Roman law provided both damage suits and injunctions as remedies for private
infringement of public trust interests. W. HUrRa, ROMAN LAw 165 (1876).
125. The Crown had rights in tidal areas as a matter of prerogative, not held fit
trust for the people, but rather as the private property for the Crown. Purprestures are
infringements on such rights.
126. GoULD, supra note 1, at 46.
127. HALE, DE PORTIBrS MARIS, 85; Regina v. Randall, 2 Carrington & Marchman 600,
607 (1842): The Queen v. Betts, 117 Eng. Rep., 1172, 1176 (1850). But see Att'y Cell.
v. Richards, 2 Anstruther 603, 615-16.
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III. Conclusion
The common law of the foreshore seems to be entering a major period
of reformulation. The changes in the last half century in the underlying
economic ratio of demand to the supply of such resources have been,
if anything, more drastic than those that presaged the feudal switch
away from Roman common ownership. The present chaotic state of
foreshore doctrines reflects not only a long history of adjustments to
the demand/supply ratio, but also the law's modem scramble to avoid
injustice in particular cases. As more interests are threatened by the
sharpened competition for tidal resources, new public easements are
being created and/or rediscovered-and the more easements there are,
the less any one of them can be absolute or the courts allowed an easy
dependence on mechanistic formulae.
We are witnessing a sharp acceleration of a process begun around
the time of Magna Charta, the reclamation of the public's interest in
the foreshore. Perhaps the day when common law citizens will have
as many rights in the foreshore as Roman citizens once did12 is near at
hand.
128. See p. 787 supra.
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